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SOCIETAL CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY FOR HOMICIDE IN 
MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 
BY THOMAS A. GREEN 
INTRODUCTION 
THE early history of English criminal aw lies hidden behind the laconic formulas 
of the rolls and law books. The rules of the law, as expounded by the judges, have 
been the subject of many studies; but their practical application in the courts, 
where the jury of the community was the final and unbridled arbiter, remains a 
mystery: in short, we know little of the social mores regarding crime and crimi- 
nals. 
This study represents an attempt to delineate one major aspect of these societal 
attitudes. Its thesis is that from late Anglo-Saxon times to the end of the middle 
ages, there existed a widespread societal distinction between 'murder,' i.e., homi- 
cide perpetrated through stealth, and simple homicide, roughly what a later legal 
age termed manslaughter. This distinction, which was imposed upon the courts 
through the instrument of the trial jury, was fundamentally at odds with the 
letter of the law. It is therefore necessary to state, if only briefly, what the rules 
of law were. 
In the early twelfth century, the Crown took exclusive jurisdiction over all 
homicides and defined them as 1) culpable and thereby capital, 2) excusable and 
thereby pardonable, 3) justifiable and thereby deserving of acquittal.' The last 
class at first incorporated the slaying of handhaving thieves and outlaws who 
resisted capture. By the middle of the fourteenth century, it came to include the 
killing of housebreakers and robbers caught in the act, though it was not until 
the sixteenth century that a statute made this policy into firm law.2 Pardonable 
homicides were those committed by the insane, unintentional homicides and 
homicides committed in self-defence. The rules of self-defence were rigorous 
throughout he entire mediaeval period. The slayer had to have made every pos- 
sible attempt to escape his attacker, must have reached a point beyond which 
he could not retreat and must have retaliated out of literally vital necessity.' All 
other homicides, those deliberate but of a sudden as well as those planned and 
stealthily perpetrated fell into the large category of culpable homicide; according 
to the rules of the law, there were to be no distinctions made among them. This 
remained true until the late sixteenth century when the judicial distinction be- 
tween murder and manslaughter finally emerged.4 
' Naomi D. Hurnard, The King's Pardon for Homicide before A.D. 1307 (London, 1969), p. 1 ff. 
Hereafter cited as Hurnard. I am grateful for the assistance of Professor S. E. Thorne of Harvard 
University, Alfred Konefsky of the Harvard Law School and Ruth Brownell Green. 
2 24 Hen. VIII, c. 15, Statutes of the Realm, 12305-1713, ed. G. Luders, T. E. Tomlins, et al (London, 
1810-28), in, 442. 
3 Infra, p. 675. 
4 J. M. Kaye, "The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter," Law Quarterly Review, LXXXIII 
(July and Oct., 1967) 365-395, 569-601. 
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670 Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability 
To be sure, the king might as a special favor grant a pardon to a felonious 
slayer, usually for a considerable fee, or as a reward for service abroad in the royal 
army. These pardons 'of grace' were emanations of the r'oyal prerogative. Pardons 
for self-defence, accident and insanity were, by the late thirteenth century, par- 
dons of course; all who deserved them according to the rules of the law were to 
receive them. After 1294, due mainly to the needs of military recruitment, par- 
dons of grace issued in far greater numbers than ever before to perpetrators of 
felonious layings of all sorts. 
Because of the nature of the evidence on which this study is based, it has 
seemed best to proceed in reverse chronological order, that is, from late fourteenth 
century evidence to move backwards to a consideration of the rules of criminal 
liability in the Anglo-Saxon period. To avoid confusion, therefore, I shall state 
at the outset the exact plan of this paper and the various types of methodology 
employed. Part I examines jury behavior in the decades immediately following 
1390 when some coroners and justices of the peace distinguished in their indict- 
ments between 'murder' and simple homicide. Although both types of homicide 
remained felonious, juries appear to have been loath to convict for the latter, 
while they frequently condemned perpetrators of the former. Before 1390, terms 
of indictment in all felonious homicides were uniform and no such correlation can 
be made. Part II, therefore, utilizes another source of evidence: a correlation of 
fourteenth century coroners' indictments with their corresponding trial verdicts 
in cases of self-defence. It will be shown that many of those who received pardons 
for self-defence had in fact committed a felonious, simple homicide. The area of 
pardonable homicide, it appears, served as a possible way out in cases where the 
community did not believe the defendant deserved to be hanged. 
Because coroners' rolls are too sparse in the pre-1300 period, there exists no 
definitive method of proving that the societal attitudes traced here precede the 
fourteenth century. In fact, a recent study of pardonable homicide in the thir- 
teenth century, by Naomi Hurnard, argues that jurors were fairly scrupulous in 
giving evidence and that their determinations did not vary substantially from at 
least the spirit of the law. In Part III I shall contend that Miss Hurnard's analysis 
does not conclusively prove the argument she sets forth and that, while her thesis 
cannot be disproved, there is much about it which remains doubtful. Moreover, 
I shall argue that the early history of criminal iability, especially that for the 
period just preceding the imposition of royal jurisdiction in all homicides, sug- 
gests that the official rules from their very inception ran counter to and never 
really became a part of social practice. This argument, admittedly speculative, 
takes the following form. During the Anglo-Saxon period only those who com- 
mitted homicide through secrecy or stealth - murder - had to pay for their act 
with their life. The new, twelfth-century practice subjected to the death penalty 
not only 'murderers' but the large class of open slayers formerly allowed to com- 
pensate for their act by payment of the wergeld. The community resisted this 
harsh extension of capital punishment and subsequently found means - acquit- 
tals and verdicts of self-defence - to impose upon the courts their long-held 
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notions of justice, a process which becomes visible to us only as of the fourteenth 
century. The societal distinction between murder and simple homicide thus had 
its source deep in the English past. The introduction of novel and strict official 
rules of liability meant the destruction of the traditional means of dispute settle- 
ment in simple homicide, but it did not obliterate traditional societal attitudes 
of liability. Nor did the imposition of a new scheme of criminal administration 
prevent society from acting, within the context of that scheme, in accordance 
with its traditional attitudes. 
Finally, in Part IV, I shall elaborate upon the nature of the mediaeval societal 
concept of 'murder' and the place of that concept within the process of dispute 
settlement. 
Throughout the entire mediaeval period for which written records are extant, 
the great majority of defendants who stood trial were acquitted. While many are 
acquitted today, one must take into account the fact that most suspects do not 
now stand trial; the vast majority of them plead guilty. In the middle ages few 
pled guilty to any felony, as the penalty was invariably capital.' 
Doubtless, many defendants deserved acquittal. Many charges were poorly 
supported. The coroner's report might reflect he testimony of only a few neigh- 
bors and might represent only the most serious charges which circulated in the 
wake of a homicide. Although coroners were required to list all those present at 
a homicide,' they often failed to do so. In many cases, they recorded the details 
of a slaying, maintaining at the same time that no one had been present except 
the slain man, who had died immediately, and the slayer, who had thereupon 
fled.7 What, then, was the source of those details? There had probably been wit- 
nesses who were not anxious to become involved, to risk coming under suspicion 
themselves. To come forward later was to risk a fine for not having raised the 
hue.8 On the other hand, what they had seen must soon have become the common 
knowledge of the countryside, and, allowing for the usual exaggerations or altera- 
tions of the true story, may have appeared in the coroner's enrollment as a fairly 
accurate account of the event. But it is difficult o separate the accurate descrip- 
5 Convictions were particularly rare at the eyre, for few would appear who had neither a pardon 
nor assurance of acquittal by the country. See Eyre of Kent, 6 and 7 Edward II, 1313-1314, ed. F. W. 
Maitland, et al (London, 1903-14), i, xlii. At gaol delivery, where nearly all the defendants had been 
arrested against their will, the record of conviction was not much better. The roll of Thomas Ingelby 
and his associates, for example, compiled at deliveries of Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, 
Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, and Warwickshire, 40-45 Edward III, contains the trials of 
160 individuals accused of homicide (twenty-four were cited as accessories or receivers). Only fifteen 
were found guilty; seventy-four were acquitted, fifty-nine were given special verdicts as self-defenders. 
The remainder came with pardons or were released for other reasons. Of the principals who denied 
the charges against them eigbtv nereent were acquitted outright. P.R.O., J.1. 3. 142, mm. 3 ff. 
6 R. F. Hunnisett, The Medieval Coroner (Cambridge, 1961), p. 24. 
7 E.g., Calendar of Coroners Rolls of the City of London, A.D. 1300-1378, ed. R. R. Sharpe (London, 
1913) Roll B, 36; Roll D, 5. 
8 HIunnisett, op. cit., pp. 10, 25. 
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tions from the cases of mere guesswork. The trial jurors probably took a more 
reasonable view, rejecting unsubstantiated testimony.9 
Though malicious prosecution and honestly moved but mistaken indictments 
may account in part for the high rate of acquittals, other factors must also have 
been at work. It is contended here that, for the most part, those few who were 
condemned had especially offended against the standards of the community. By 
discriminating between them and the many who committed homicides of a less 
serious nature, the jurors were creating, de facto, a classification roughly similar 
to the later legal distinction between murder and manslaughter. 
The clearest evidence of juries discriminating on the basis of the nature of the 
slaying dates from the end of the fourteenth century and the first decades of the 
fifteenth. In 1390, century long protests against the royal pardoning policy culmi- 
nated in a statute which restricted the power which the king had to grant to those 
who had committed murder pardons of grace.'0 'Murder,' as a term of art, re- 
ferred to the most heinous forms of homicide, those perpetrated through stealth, 
at night or by ambush. It appears to have been directed especially at murderous 
assaults committed by professional highwaymen and burglars for monetary gain. 
The King agreed not to pardon murderers lightly; moreover, no pardon for mur- 
der would be valid unless it made specific mention of 'murder.' It is extremely 
important o note that culpable homicide continued to include both murder and 
simple homicide. Both were capital; no judicial distinction was made between 
them. The term 'murder' was employed, where relevant, solely for the purpose 
of administering the Statute of 1390. Though the statute's effectiveness was 
short-lived, for several decades 'murder' found its way into some homicide 
indictments. 
Analysis of several trial rolls which include indictments by coroners and justices 
of the peace who, despite the courts' failure to apply the 1390 statute, bothered 
to discriminate between murder and simple homicide reveals that juries acquitted 
the great majority of non-murderers and sent murderers to the gallows about 
fifty percent of the time." 
A gaol delivery roll covering the first eight years of the reign of Henry VI 
demonstrates the point quite clearly.'2 The roll was compiled for James Strang- 
ways and his fellows, who visited the gaols of Lincoln, Nottingham, Northamp- 
ton, Warwick and Leicester. A total of 114 defendants came before them to 
9 See Hurnard, pp. 361 if., for an analysis of inquisitions, held on a writ de odio et atia, to ascertain 
the veracity of appeals and indictments. 
10 The background to the statute of 1390 is given in Kaye, "Early History," Part I. My interpreta- 
tion of the statute itself differs from that of Kaye, who argued that it limited pardons in all types of 
felonious homicides. I plan to publish an article dealing with the statute and with the early history 
of the official distinction between murder and manslaughter. 
11 I have chosen those rolls, or sections of rolls, which contain a substantial number of indictments 
for homicide and where it seems clear that coroners and justices of the peace inserted, when relevant, 
murdravit or its statutory equivalent: insidiavit. On many other rolls, of course, where no distinction 
was made, indictments not including these terms of art often ended in convictions. A fuller analysis 
of the post-1390 gaol delivery rolls will appear in the study referred to, supra n.10. 
12 J.I. S. 203. 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Thu, 14 Nov 2013 14:49:50 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability 673 
answer indictments for homicide, in seventy-seven different cases. Of these, ex- 
cluding those excused for faulty indictments and those for whom the jury re- 
turned special verdicts, eighty-four men were acquitted and twenty were con- 
demned to death. The latter group, with one exception, had been indicted for 
murder. Acquittals, on the other hand, were registered for thirty-seven indicted 
for simple homicide and for forty-seven held for murder. Taking only principals 
into account, eighteen of the nineteen hanged had been charged with murder and 
of the forty-five acquitted, only seventeen were murder suspects. Thus, while an 
indictment for simple homicide practically assured the principal defendant of 
exculpation (one of twenty-nine was hanged), an allegation of murder put his 
chances at about fifty-fifty (eighteen of thirty-five were hanged).'3 
Similarly, John Cokayn's roll, compiled over the years of Henry V's reign from 
deliveries of the gaols in Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northampton- 
shire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland and Warwickshire, records fifteen convictions 
based on murder indictments and only four based on simple homicide, despite 
the fact that there are substantially more simple homicides on the roll.'4 The en- 
rollments for Leicester gaol, based on several deliveries during the reign of 
Henry IV, show only four convictions, all based on murder allegations. Of the 
thirteen acquittals, seven of the original indictments were for murder, six for 
simple homicide.'5 John Martyn's roll for the far western circuit, 1424-1430, 
presents ten simple homicides, nine of which ended in acquittal and five murders, 
four of which led to convictions.'6 
There is no evidence that the judges pushed juries to convict in murder indict- 
ments. Certainly, the judges did not encourage juries to acquit those indicted 
for simple homicide. Only the grounds of self-defence justified the deliberate 
slaying of a person who was neither a convicted nor a manifest felon, and the 
test for self-defence remained quite rigorous. As Prisot, J., stated as late as 1454: 
... if a man assaults you in order to beat you it is not lawful for you to say you want to 
kill him and to endanger his life and limb: but if the case is such that he has you at such 
advantage that he intends to kill you as you seek to flee and he is swifter than you and 
pursues you so that you are unable to escape; or if you are on the ground under him; or 
if be chases you to a wall or hedge or dike, so that you cannot escape, then it is lawful for 
you to say that if he won't desist, you want to slay him to save your own life, and thus 
you may menace him for such special cause.... 17 
13 Two of the seventeen had been indicted for murder by one inquest and for simple homicide by 
the other: coroners' indictments often differed from those of the justices of the peace. 
14 J.1. 3. 195. 
16 J.1. 3. 188. 
16 J.1. 3. 205. The 'simple homicide' resulting in conviction was the slaying of a man by his wife, an 
act which the community usually construed as murder. Infra, p. 693. 
17 Year Books, 1422-1461 (Henry VI) (London, 1556-74), 33 Hen. VI, Easter, pl. 10: . . . quar 
5i un home vous assaute de vou batre n'e loial i vous adire que vous voiles luy tuer, et de luy menasser de 
vie et de membre: mes si l'cas soit tiel, q'il ad vous a tiel advantage q par entend il voilloit vous tuer come i 
voiles fuir, et il est plus courrant que vous estes, et alla apres vous, issint que ne vous poies luy escaper; 
ou autrement que vous estes desouh luy al'terre; ou s'il ad enchace vous a un mure ou un hedge ou dike, 
i8sint q' vous ne poies luy escape, donq's est loial p vous adire q s'il ne veut departir de VOU8, q'vous en 
8a0lvatio de vostre vie luy voiles tuer, et issint vous poies luy mena8ser pour tiel special cause ...." 
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The judges at gaol delivery could invoke these standards but they could not im- 
pose them upon the jury. They could relieve their frustration only by getting on 
to the next case, the next county-town. Evidence of false testimony lay all about 
them, but pursuing it would have been very time consuming. Testimony given 
at coroners' inquests could not have been so systematically wrong as the verdicts 
of petty juries made it appear, yet if questioned, the jurors would simply have 
continued to swear on their oaths that the defendant was not guilty. The court 
could have done little short of undertaking a fullscale investigation of the homi- 
cide, and lacking a police force and any sophisticated evidence-gathering tech- 
niques, even that would seldom have made the matter any clearer.18 
II 
Our demonstration that juries acted upon their own extra-legal theory of 
culpable homicide - based, broadly speaking, on the distinction between serious 
and simple homicides - is limited thus far to the post-1390 period. It is likely 
that society made this distinction earlier, but it is not easy to prove. Before 1390 
gaol delivery enrollments, in recording the indictment made before the coroner 
or justice of the peace, almost invariably used only the unenlightening phrase 
felonice interfecit. Thus it is impossible to show from them that juries distin- 
guished between types of felonious homicides. If we work backwards from the 
trial roll to the indictment as it appeared on the original coroner's roll, two nearly 
insuperable problems are presented: the greater part of the original inquests are 
no longer extant; those that do survive generally contain only the operative 
phrase, felonice interfecit, with few details from which the nature of the act can 
be deduced. One of the few coroners' rolls that does supply such details is the 
roll of Edmund de Ovyng.1" It is also the longest of the extant coroners' rolls. Of 
the twenty-five cases on Ovyng's sixty-nine membrane roll that present homicides 
identifiable on the trial rolls, only two ended in convictions.20 Both show the 
characteristics of murder, but in one the defendant confessed and turned ap- 
prover.2' This sort of piecemeal evidence, drawn from isolated cases on many 
different rolls over a century or more, does not afford convincing proof. 
18 The procedure of attaint of the jury "was never extended to the criminal jury which had been 
'chosen' by the defendant." S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (London, 
1969), p. 866. 
19 J.1. 2. 18 (Cambridgeshire, 14-89 Edw. III). 
20 Nine ended in acquittals, eleven in findings of self-defence, one defendant came forward with a 
pardon, one died in gaol and one was remanded. 
21 J.IJ. 9. 18, m. 921/4 (1349): ... noctanter felonice interfecit R. B. et M. uxorem eius . The 
gaol delivery roll (J.I. 3. 134, m.38/5) used the form, "felonice et sediciose interfecit . . . noctanter." 
In the second case, testimony was recorded at the coroner's inquest [J.I. 92. 18, m.5d/4 (1346)] that, 
" ... post horam cubitus [A] surexit extra cubitum suum ... insultum fecit eidem W.... W. surexit 
a lecto suo" and raised the hue, at which point the defendant stabbed him to death. The accused 
turned approver. For the gaol delivery enrollment, see J.I. 3. 134, m.34/4 (1346). Although little 
can be made of such rare cases, they deserve some comment. They are the only cases which led to 
conviction. Both have elements of "murder." The first was secretly done, at night; the second was an 
attack on a man in his own bed. Though the defendant confessed, it is unlikely he would have done so 
had the jury not been about to declare him guilty. This is precisely what we would expect to find if a 
more extensive comparison were possible. 
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The only feasible approach to our problem is to compare the coroner's indict- 
ment with the trial enrollment in cases ending in a verdict of self-defence. As we 
have seen, the law of self-defence was very strict. The slayer had to have acted 
as a last resort which meant, in effect, that the jury had to detail the defendant's 
attempts to escape his assailant. Verdicts of self-defence appear on the trial rolls 
as a series of formulas which put the defendant's actions in the best possible light. 
The slain man was usually said to have provoked the fight and dealt the first 
blow; the defendant then had attempted to escape, only to find himself cornered 
or thrown down and held to the ground; gravely wounded, the defendant as a 
last resort drew a weapon and saved his life in the only way possible. Often, it 
was specified that the defendant had retaliated with a single blow.22 Doubtless, 
some of these details represented embellishments of the truth. Some of them 
even went beyond the rigorous requirements of the law. It would have been suffi- 
cient, for purposes of eligibillty for royal pardon, to allege that the defendant had 
retreated as far as possible and had struck back as a last resort; had he not yet 
been wounded or had he needed to retaliate with multiple blows, he would still 
have been eligible. 
It thus becomes critical to determine just how much the jury embellished the 
defendant's true case. If juries used the category of pardonable homicide to excul- 
pate manslaughterers, they would have fabricated stories of retreat and last 
resort where in fact there had been neither. They would have cast fights willingly 
entered by the defendant, possibly ones wherein he had struck the first blow, as 
struggles in which the defendant was an unwilling participant. If the juries per- 
petrated such fabrications, it would be visible to us only through a comparison 
of the trial enrollments with the corresponding coroners' enrollments. The coro- 
ner s enrollment was often far less formulistic and represented an obviously more 
candid response from the jury. It was a record which could be contradicted or 
embellished in court without reprimand to the jury or detriment o the defen- 
dant's case. 
Admittedly, several methodological difficulties arise in employing the coroners' 
rolls. In the first place, the coroner's inquest was held very soon after the homicide 
occurred, and in some cases additional evidence must have come to light after the 
inquest had been held. Moreover, the coroners' enrollments nearly always name 
one suspect and set forth one set of facts as to the circumstances of the homicide. 
We know nothing of the process by which these seemingly unanimous inquest 
verdicts were reached. They probably represented the belief of the majority of 
the jurors. Many inquest votes may have been close and their outcome may have 
resulted from the prestige or power of one or two persons. Many coroners (or 
their clerks) were erratic in the enrollment of details; the fact that only a few 
facts were set down in a given case does not mean that others were not stated at 
the inquest. Finally, some enrollments were malicious indictments. This is more 
likely to have been the case where there had been only one witness or where there 
had not been a witness, but merely a "first finder." The witness or finder would 
have been in a strong position to place the blame where he pleased. 
n E.g., J.1. s. 142, m.6d/2 (1367); J.I. S. 142, m.10d/2 (1371). 
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Several steps have been taken in order to mitigate the above problem. Coro- 
ners' inquest juries often stated that a homicide had been committed in self- 
defence although the evidence they presented did not meet the legal requirements 
for a pardon. These cases are the best source of evidence of community attitudes 
and I have relied heavily upon them. I have excluded from my study coroners' 
rolls which include very few details. It is clear that the clerks compiling these 
rolls did not bother to enroll evidence of self-defence, but merely characterized 
all homicides as felonious. Therefore, it is unsafe to assume that any correspond- 
ing trial verdict of self-defence represented an alteration of the facts. I have in- 
stead relied upon rolls which include a great deal of detail in most cases. This 
allowed the assumption that where the coroner's inquest did produce testimony 
of self-defence it was duly enrolled. 
In order to kill in self-defence, itwas necessary for the man attacked to retreat 
until retreat was no longer possible. At the trial the jurors always alleged the 
presence of such an impasse, and though that was sometimes true,23 a comparison 
of the coroners' rolls and the trial rolls reveals that it often was not and that a 
petty jury had so altered the facts as to make pardonable what the law considered 
nonpardonable. From the community's point of view, a violent attack could be 
met by a violent response. A man whose life was threatened did not have to seek 
some means of escape; indeed, he need not do so though he was not in danger of 
losing his life. The court's concern with last resort indicates a concept of criminal 
liability fundamentally at odds with prevailing social notions. 
A case from a Norfolk coroner's roll indicates the looseness of the social concept 
of self-defence: 
William put his hand to his knife in order to draw it and strike Robert. Robert, fearing 
that William wanted to kill him, in self-defence struck William on the head with a 
hatchet.24 
Edmund de Ovyng, the Cambridge coroner, was usually very careful to report 
inquest findings in detail.26 He recorded a case of homicide se defendendo in which 
the assailant had seized the defendant's beard. Walter Clerk and Thomas Clerk 
argued until Thomas, threatening to kill Walter, 
23 For various examples on coroners' rolls of clearly stated last resort, see, J.I. 2. 102, m.9d/2: 
"fugit usque ad quoddam angulum domus" (1363); J.I. 2. 18, m.5/4: "iacuit super ipsum" (1345); 
J.I. 2. 102, m.lld/2 (1364); J.I. 2. 67, m.5/3: "quandam ripam ubi voluit transisse et non potuit pro 
profunditate etlargitudine dicte aque." (1354); J.I. 2. 18, m.52d/2: "cessidit ad terram . . . A. fuit in 
proposito interfecisse . . . B." (1361); J.I. 2. 18, m.61/1: "supersit predictum J. in ulnas suas" (1364); 
J.I. 2. 23, m.2/2: "non potuit evadere propter multitudinem inimicorum suorum" (1373). The fact that 
the coroner's inquest produced such testimony does not mean that the facts were true; they might 
have been altered at this early stage. But in such cases the trial jury was not adducing facts contrary 
to those of the indictment. 
24 J.I. 2. 102, m.9/2: "Willelmus misit manurn suum ad cultellum suum abtrahendum et ad percuci- 
endum dictum Robertum. Idemque Robertus timens quod idem W. voluit occidisse eum in defensione vite 
mue percussit eundem W. in capite super cervicem eiusdem cum quadam hachia" (1363). The trial record 
(Oyer and Terminer) has not been located, but the slayer was pardoned for self-defence: Calendar of 
the Patent Rolls, 1232-1422 (London, 1906), May 6, 1367, p. 395. Hereafter cited as C.P.R. See also 
J.I. 2. 58, m.2/2 (1379). 
25 J.I. 2. 18 (14-89 Edw. III); J.I. 2. 256, mm. 1-4 (44-48 Edw. III). 
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suddenly jumped from the cart and took up an iron fork, intending torun at Walter, but 
Walter immediately grabbed the fork in his own hand and threw it from Thomas lest he 
do further damage with it; for which Thomas took Walter by the beard; Walter, because 
of this, drew his knife and in self-defence struck Thomas in the left arm so that he died.26 
Thomas' attack and intentions, rather than the imminence of danger to Walter's 
life, were the basis for the finding of self-defence. In a similar instance, Hugh 
Harpour, chaplain, took John atte Lane, also a chaplain, in his hands and 
threw him down feloniously athis feet and wanted to kill him ... because of this, John, 
fearing death and getting up, drew his knife and stabbed Hugh in the chest.27 
Hugh seems to have been weaponless, so that John was not in imminent danger 
of death. Nevertheless, he was repelling an attack, and thus in a sense, defending 
himself. The resistance was excessive, but the community did not scruple as to 
the nature of the retaliation. The trial jury provided an elaborate story of self- 
defence.28 
Jurors at a Leicestershire coroner's inquest in 1365 told a complicated story 
with respect to the death of Richard de Sydenfen.29 Richard Ruskin and his son 
William came to the door of William de Assheby's house in Melton and the elder 
Ruskin brought Assheby outside with sword drawn by calling him a liar. After a 
struggle, Assheby chased his enemies to the door of their house where Ruskin 
senior's servant, Sydenfen, seeing that his master was in grave danger, felled 
Assheby with the blow of a club. The latter revived, and drawing a small knife, 
slew the servant "in self-defence." Assheby did not retreat once he had risen to 
his feet, but that was of no consequence. Nor did it matter that he had entered 
the fray of his own choosing. When he killed Sydenfen he was acting in "self- 
defence."30 
Jurors at an inequest in Aldgate Ward, London, in 1325, described a somewhat 
one-sided fight which, however, grew out of a sudden quarrel: 
26 J.I. 2. 18, m.45d/5: "W.C. et T.C.... simul cum una caretta pro garbis querendo ... et contencio 
mota inter ipsos T.... stetit super carettam querandam et minavit ipsum Walterum de vita et membra 
et festinans descendens de caretta cepit unum furcum ferratum et voluit concurasse super dictum W. et 
incontinenti dictus W. cepit furcum in manu sua et illud iactavit ab ipso ne dampnum ulterius cum illo 
faceret quo facto dictus T. cepit ipsum W. per barbam suam quo facto dictus W. traxit cultellum suum et 
in defensione sua percussit predictum T. in brachio sinistro . . . " (1357). The trial enrollment has not 
been located. 
27 J.I. 2. 18, m.47d/4: "'... cepit in manibus suis et iactavit ipsum feloniter humo sub pedibus suis 
et ipsum voluit interfecisse . . . quo facto predictus Johannes atte Lane timens morteam suam et in resur- 
gendo de pedibus ipsius Hugonis traxit cultellum suum ... et percussit predictum Hugonem in pee- 
tore ...." (1358). The trial enrollment (P.R.O., C. 47, Cambridge, File 6/87) is partly blind, but the 
legible parts indicate a classic form of self-defence. See also, J.I. 2. 58, m.4/2 (1380), where the accused 
had been thrown to the ground before slaying his assailant. There is no mention of any weapon used 
by the assailant, but the inquest jury maintained the homicide was committed in self-defence. No 
trial enrollment located. 
28 In some cases, the self-defender seems to have stood his ground and waited for his assailant to 
reach him despite the fact that there was no apparent obstacle to retreat. E.g., J.I. 2. 18, m.16/S 
(1351); trial enrollment at J.I. 3. 134, m.41/1; J.I. 2. 58, m.3d/1 (1379); trial enrollment not located. 
29 J.I. 2. 53, m.3d/4. 
30 When Assheby came to trial he already had a pardon. J.I. 3 142, m.18/1; C.P.R., Dec. 6, 1366, 
p. 345. 
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John le Marche, 'pottere,' and Agnes de Wycoumbe after the hour of curfew, were 
quarreling inthe High Street opposite the house of John . . . when the said Agnes taking 
a staff . .. out of the hand of John . .. therewith struck the said John on the back and 
sides; that thereupon came Geoffrey deCaxtone . . . and Andrew de Wynton, 'pottere,' 
with staves in their hands to assist the said Agnes and struck the said John on the head 
and body, so that he died a week later.3' 
A trial enrollment is extant only in the case of Andrew.32 The petty jurors testified 
that John met Andrew some distance from the place of the slaying and struck 
him on the head with a staff.33 Andrew fled until he was up against a wall and 
forced to retaliate.34 There was no mention of any other principals to the homi- 
cide. 
Testimony of a more unusual sort was given by inquest jurors at an Aldersgate 
viewing of a dead man, a certain John de Chiggewell: 
John Pentyn would have hanged himself in his solar, and on that account his wife 
Clemencia raised the cry so that the said John de Chiggewell, John atte Mersshe, Adam 
de Wykham and other neighbors, names unknown, came to her assistance, and that 
when the said John de Chiggewell would have entered the solar before the others,. 
Pentyn feloniously struck him on the head ... inflicting a mortal wound....35 
At Pentyn's trial, the petty jury alleged that he had argued with his wife and, 
after she had left the house, had locked the door and gone up to his bed in the 
solar. Clemencia returned in the evening and finding herself locked out, raised the 
hue, at which point Chiggewell arrived, ascended the stairs to the solar and tried 
to kill Pentyn with a hatchet. Pentyn, unable to escape, grabbed an iron window 
bar and in self-defence gave his assailant one blow from which he died fifteen 
days later.36 
Finally, a simple homicide led to a special verdict of self-defence in the case of 
John Counte, who, after quarreling with Robert Paunchard in Bishopsgate Ward, 
London, drew a knife and stabbed Paunchard to death.37 The trial jury main- 
tained that Paunchard had thrown rocks at Counte and driven him to a wall.38 
By the middle of the fourteenth century, a defendant who had slain a house- 
breaker might be acquitted by judgment of the court.39 The same applied where 
he had slain someone who came to rob him. The courts were not consistent in 
81 London Coroners' Rolls, Roll E, 85, pp. 162-3. 
82 According to the coroner's roll, Andrew and a certain Robert le Raykere, who had "aided and 
abetted" the felony, were immediately captured; Agnes and Geoffrey fled. 
83 C. 260/87 no. 7. (1326). See also, J.I. 3. 43/3, m.2/1 (1326) for the original trial enrollment. 
84 Pardon: C.P.R., Feb. 22, 1327, p. 24. 
85 London Coroners' Rolls, Roll B, 42, pp. 65-6. 
86 C. 260/32 no. 15. (1322). Order to bail Pentyn: Calendar of the Close Rolls, 1272-1447 (London, 
1900-37), April 13, 1323, p. 636. 
3 London Coroners' Rolls, Roll H, 9, pp. 242-3. 
38 C. 260/50 no. 61. (1339). It is possible that the jury was influenced by the location of the slaying. 
The fight had taken place in the close of the Earl of Warren where Robert Artoys, by whom Counte 
was employed as a cook, resided. 
39 Supra, p 669. 
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their treatment of such cases, and it appears that at least until late into the cen- 
tury, acquittal might depend upon clear evidence of self-defence. In this area, 
the community was ahead of the courts. Trial juries supplied evidence of self- 
defence where, on the basis of coroner's inquest testimony there had been neither 
true self defence nor even clear evidence of housebreaking or attempted theft. 
In one instance, where self-defence may in fact have been involved, though the 
jurors at the inquest made no mention of last resort, the deceased had entered the 
close of William Childerle 
at the hour of Prime without he license of William and against he latter's will....40 
William returned home from the fields and met Richard on the stairs of his solar 
where a struggle ensued and the intruder was slain. At the trial, the petty jury 
assured the court that William had fled to a wall near the door of the house where 
he was finally cornered and forced to strike back in self-defence.4' Thomas 
Randolph of Braunston, Leicestershire, saw someone standing outside his window 
at night and demanded to know who it was.42 Receiving no answer, he took up a 
club and went outside where the trespasser, John Sherman, attacked him. Stand- 
ing his ground, Thomas dealt Sherman a fatal blow, which the inquest jurors 
said was done in self-defence.43 Similarly, Henry Priour, attacked by William, son 
of John Paryn, who came one evening to the door of Henry's house, retaliated 
immediately with a club.44 At Priour's trial, the petty jury asserted that William 
attacked Henry "ad domum ipsius Henrici" and drove him to a wall where he, 
Henry, happened to find the club he used; he thus had slain in self-defence.45 
In a more extreme case, it was considered self-defence where the defendant on 
his master's property slew a man who had hurled insults at him.46 William de 
Walynford, 'brewere,' quarreled with Simon de Parys in Cheap and the latter 
followed William home, threatening him as they went. The coroner recorded that 
William forbade Simon to insult him in his master's house and then immediately 
William fetched a knife and plunged it into Simon's chest. In the petty jury's ac- 
count, however, the facts were altered to show that Simon had attacked William 
with a knife as they stood in the king's highway: William fled to his master's 
house, where, being cornered by his assailant, he had slain him as a last resort.47 
One related and extraordinary case, for which coroner's indictment and trial 
enrollment are both extant, shows how the community sanctioned the slaying of 
an adulterer. An aggrieved husband was not permitted to take the adulterer's 
40 J.1. 2. 18, m.41d/2: "circa horam prima sine licencia ipsius Willelmi et contra voluntate ipsius 
Willelmi" (1356). 
41 C. 260/68 no. 20. (1357); Pardon: C.P.R., May 3, 1357, p. 530. 
42 J.1. 2. 58, m.i/i (1379). 
43 No trial enrollment has been located for this case. Possibly, the defendant was acquitted as a 
slayer of a thief. 
44 J.I. 2. 18, m.44d/3 (1854). 
45 J.I. 3. 139, m.13d/1 (1856)..The defendant was remanded to await a pardon. 
48 London Coroners' Rolls, Roll C, 13, p. 80. 
47 J.I. 3. 43/1, m.21/1 (1324). 
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life,48 but as in the case of a trespasser upon his land, he would have been able to 
drive him away. Robert Bousserman returned home at mid-day, an inquest jury 
testified, to find John Doughty having sexual intercourse with his wife ("ad 
fornicandum cum illa").49 Bousserman forthwith despatched Doughty with a 
blow of his hatchet. The petty jury altered the facts to make Robert a self- 
defender who could not escape and to emphasize the aspect of trespass: 
John Doughty came at night to the house of Robert in the village of Laghscale as 
Robert and his wife lay asleep in bed in the peace of the King, and be entered Robert's 
house; seeing this, Robert's wife secretly rose from her husband and went to John and 
John went to bed with Robert's wife; in the meantime Robert was awake and hearing 
noise in his house and seeing that his wife had left his bed rose and sought her in his 
house and found her with John; immediately John attacked Robert with a knife . . . 
and wounded him and stood between him and the door of Robert's house continually 
stabbing and wounding him and Robert seeing that his life was in danger and that he 
could in no way flee further, inorder to save his life took up a hatchet and gave John one 
blow in the head....60 
The allegation that the slain man had secretely entered a house at night while the 
master of the house slept was one of the common elements of later indictments for 
'murder.'51 In this case it was unnecessary; the jurors needed to do no more than 
provide the usual allegations of homicide se defendendo. Possibly, the elaborations 
by the trial jury indicate an especially strong sense of outrage. 
The community was also ready to excuse homicide which occurred in defence 
of a kinsman though the slayer was not himself in mortal danger. The petty jury 
had to alter the true facts by asserting that the accused himself had come under 
attack and had slain his assailant as a last resort.52 This may be seen in a number 
of cases. 
A Buckinghamshire coroner, John atte Broke, recorded that John Colles, 
48 Cf., Sir F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, The [istory of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, 
2nd ed. (London, 1898), ii, 484-5: "There are signs that the outraged husband who found his wife in 
the act of adultery might no longer slay the guilty pair or either of them, but might emasculate the 
adulterer." It seems doubtful that this practice survived into the fourteenth century. 
49 J.I. 2. 211, m.1d/i (1341). 
50 J.1. 3. 78, m.2d/1: " . . . infra nocte predictus Johannes Doughty venit ad domum ipsius Roberti 
in predicta villa de Laghscales prefato R. cum uxore sua in lecto suo in pace Regis iacente et sompniente 
et domum ipsius R. intravit quod percipiens uxor ipsius R. secrete a viro suo surexit et ad ipsum J. ivit 
et predictus J. uxorem ipsius R. ibidem concubiit . . . medio tempore predictus R. vigilavit et audiens 
tumultum in domo sua et percipiens uxorem suam a lecto suo abesse surexit et querendo eam in domo sua 
invenit eam cum predicto J. et statim predictus J. in ipsum R. cum quodam cultello vocato [tear in mem- 
brane] ibidem insultum fecit et ipsum verberavit vulneravit et inter ipsum et hostium eiusdem domus 
stetit semper cum cultello predicto ipsum percuciendo et vulnerando ipsum ibidem ad interficiendum et 
predictus R. videns periculum mortis ibi iminere et se ulterius nullo modo posse diffugere causa mortem 
suam propriam evitandi sumpsit quoddam polhachet et inde percussit predictum J. solo ictu in capite 
usque cerebrum unde statim obiit ...." (134 ). 
51 Supra, p. 6792. 
62 Miss Hurnard states the common law rule as restricting self-defence to defence of one's own life. 
She appears to have found no cases where defence of one's kin was alleged. 
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senior, and his son John stood talking to William Shepherde when an argument 
broke out. Shepherde struck Colles senior with a staff. 
Seeing this, John Colles junior drew his knife and struck Shepherde in the right part of 
the neck wounding him mortally!3 
Broke concluded his enrollment with the phrase, "and thus he slew him feloni- 
ously," and indeed the younger Colles had clearly not been attacked. At the trial, 
however, the petty jury asserted that after Shepherde had begun the quarrel, 
and had struck Colles senior, Colles junior intervened to part them. Shepherde 
then turned on Colles junior, who fled as far as a wall between two houses where 
he was forced to slay his attacker in self-defence." 
According to a London coroner's roll, Simon Chaucer and Robert de Uptone 
quarreled on the street in Cordwainer Street Ward; Simon struck Robert, wound- 
ing him on the upper lip (there is no mention of a weapon). John, Robert's son, 
who was present and saw the incident, seized a "dorbarre" with which he beat 
Simon on the hands, side and head, killing him.55 The petty jury told an elaborate 
story, which made John eligible for a royal pardon: 
A quarrel broke out between Simon and Robert over certain pennies which Simon owed 
the latter. Simon took up a staff and wanted to strike Robert, but Robert grasped it 
firmly in his hands . . . Simon drew a knife and stabbed Robert in the mouth so that 
blood flowed. John, sitting in a shop (shopa), saw the fight and rising and taking up a 
dorbarre ran to the fight o pacify the two if he could. When Simon saw John coming he 
left Robert and went after John with the knife .. . he chased John as far as a wall in 
Aldermannescherche and held him tightly against the wall so that John could not 
escape... .56 
Similarly, Alice, the wife of James Almand, 'Pipere,' who slew John Langetolft 
in London, was said at her trial to have entered a fray to save James, only to end 
by slaying in self-defence. The petty jury added, however, that she slew John in 
order to save not only her own life but that of her husband.57 The coroner's indict- 
58 C. 260/105 no. 13: " . . . hoc videns extraxit cultellum suum . . . et percussit prefatum Willelmum 
in dextera parte colli faciens ei plagam mortalem et sic ipsum felonice inteifecit. . " (1393). The 
coroner's indictment is enrolled on the King's Bench transcript of the trial proceedings. 
54 Ibid. Colles junior was released, pending his pardon, in the hands of four men, one of whom 
was his father. 
66 London Coroners' Rolls, Roll F, 4, pp. 175-6. 
56 C. 260/50 no. 60: " . . . contencio riebatur inter Simonem et Robertum de Uptone patrem predicti 
Johannis pro certis denariis eidem Roberto per prefatum Simonem debitis. Ita quod predictus Simon 
cepit in manu sua quendam baculum ... et inde percussisse voluit predictum Robertum quem baculum 
predictus Robertus in manibus suis ita firmiter tenuit ... Simon ... extraxit quendam cultellum suum 
qui vocatur Bideu et inde percussit predictum Robertum in ore ita quod sanguis inde exivit. Predictus 
Johannes edens ibidem in quadam shopa et videns dictum patrem suum et prefatum Simonem sic fore in 
contumelia surrexit et cepit quendam Dorebarre in manu sua et cucurrit eis ad contumeliam illam paci- 
ficandam si potuisset. Et cum predictus Simon vidit ipsum Johannem sic venientem reliquit predictum 
Robertum et se dedit eidem Johanni cum prefato Bideu in manu sua extracto et ipsum inde fugavit ad 
quandam parietem de Aldermannescherche contra quem parietem predictus Simon ipsum Johannem cum 
manu sua sinistra ita strite tenuit quod ex nulla parte evadere potuit . . . " (1340). Despite his immediate 
capture, John did not appear at gaol delivery until 1339, some three years thereafter. John was par- 
doned in Jan., 1840 (C.P.R., p. 351). 
57 C. 9260/792 no. 15. (1361). 
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ment copied onto the gaol delivery roll states that she slew John feloniously, no 
mention being made of self-defence. 
A Cambridge jury converted a more serious manslaughter into pardonable 
homicide when it altered the facts of Richard Godmancoster's slaying at the 
hands of William Holdy. Edmund de Ovyng's coroner's roll states that William 
came upon his brother Thomas and Richard as they quarreled. William drew his 
knife and stabbed Richard in the back.58 Ovyng termed the homicide a felony. 
The trial jury's reworking of the facts provided ample evidence of last resort and 
asserted that Godmancester had died of a wound in the stomach, a rather more 
reasonable place for a self-defender to stab his adversary.59 
In none of the above cases had the defendant in fact acted out of true pre- 
meditation. Where the defendant had supplied the initial provocation, it appears 
to have been a less than homicidal attack, which then escalated with fatal results. 
Certainly, these slatyings were not 'murders' in the sense that term was used by 
the late fourteenth century. The defendant had not ambushed the deceased or 
employed other means of stealth. But in none of them would the defendant have 
merited a royal pardon under the terms of the law. Had the true story come out 
in court, as the statement of Prisot indicates, the defendant would have been 
sentenced to death.60 
One final and difficult question: are we dealing here with an expanded notion 
of self-defence or with a broader attitude that only murderers ought to be hanged? 
The answer must be that there is evidence of both. Surely, in many, perhaps most 
of the above cases the community believed the slaying was justified even though 
the official rules of self-defence had not been met. But in others there had been 
little or no element of self-defence and the trial verdict appears to be an entire 
fiction devised for purposes of saving the defendant's neck. 
Perhaps all that can be said is that given the nature of mediaeval social life, the 
rules of both self-defence and felonious homicide were unrealistically strict. If 
firmly applied, they would have meant the condemnation of men of pride who, 
when under attack, did not turn tail and flee until cornered beyond all hope of 
58 J.1. 2. 18, m.15d/3 (1351). 
69 J.I. 3. 134, m.41/4 (1348). The accused was thrown to the ground and lay "subtus quandam 
parietem ... insurgendo versus dictum parietem se defendendo percussit predictum Willelmum [sic] 
in ventre." For a case in which self-defence involved striking a man in the back, see Calendar of Inquisi- 
tions Miscellaneous (Chancery), 1219-1377 (London, 1916-1937), #2126. 
60 This study remains somewhat tentative. The great majority of cases for which I located both an 
indictment and a trial enrollment could not be used. In hundreds of cases, indictments for felonious 
homicide led to trial verdicts of self-defence, but it is unclear that the coroner bothered to record 
details of self-defence. In many others where both indictment and verdict agreed on self-defence, the 
former was so formulistic as to raise suspicion that fact alteration had already taken place. Another 
possible approach to the problem of demonstrating fact alteration is to analyze the formulistic verdicts 
of self-defence. Miss Hurnard's suspicions about the post-1294 period appear to have been raised by 
the frequent use of a limited number of excuses. My approach in fact makes this very point while 
going a step further and showing that the formulas were not merely convenient summaries for what 
were in fact instances of pardonable homicide. 
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further escape. They would also have meant the hanging of men who, in sudden 
anger, struck a blow which, due to infection, resulted in death. These are differ- 
ent cases, occasioning different motives for leniency. Many homicides must have 
combined elements of both these cases. It is, however, impossible to determine 
where society drew the line between homicides it viewed as justifiable self-defence 
and homicides it viewed as unjustifiable but, nevertheless, not deserving capital 
punishment. Nor, for that matter, is it possible to determine which slayings in the 
latter class were considered as so impetuous as to be akin to accidental homicides. 
It is likely that some simple homicides were recast by trial jurors as misadven- 
tures, and hence made pardonable, but there are too few such special verdicts on 
the fourteenth century rolls to make comparison with the coroner's enrollment 
profitable. The sub-groups within the area of simple homicide must have shaded 
into one another and distinctions among them probably differed over time and 
distance. Moreover, as I shall suggest in Part iv, many social and psychological 
factors must have played a role in the formation of the community's attitude to- 
ward individual defendants and its perception of their deeds. 
III 
The foregoing study suggests that, in the fourteenth century, trial jurors were 
not above characterizing as pardonable 'simple' homicide, roughly what we would 
call manslaughter. The present section of this study seeks to assess the argument 
recently put forth by Naomi D. Hurnard that in the thirteenth century trial 
jurors' verdicts closely represented the truth. Miss Hurnard concluded her analy- 
sis of royal pardons for homicide with the end of the reign of Edward I, but she 
hinted that jury behavior might have changed in the ensuing period. She pointed 
out that the sudden increase of pardons de gratia after 1294 caused a fundamental 
break with earlier practice. The implication of her remarks is that conclusions 
arrived at on the basis of fourteenth century evidence cannot be carried back into 
the earlier period. The specific argument here would be that, after 1294, jurors, 
with knowledge of the indiscriminate dispensing of pardons to slayers, altered 
their outlook toward homicide defendants - especially toward those who had 
committed a simple homicide - and found pardonable circumstances where there 
had been none. The jury would have reasoned, in effect, that a man who by acting 
with more despatch might have made himself invulnerable to prosecution should 
not be hanged unless he was of the most disreputable sort. In my view, while the 
new pardoning policy might have increased the jury's willingness to alter the facts 
in favor of the defendant, that policy was not the real source of jury attitudes. 
Jury behavior did not change radically after 1294: from very outset of the common 
law period, juries were inclined to structure the evidence in such a way as to save 
the life of the manslaughterer. 
a. 
In her chapter on 'The Verdicts,' Miss Hurnard examined the extent to which 
juries fabricated facts in order to ensure that the defendant would receilve a par- 
don for excusable homicide. Her analysis is based upon comparison of the allega- 
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tions made by jurors at special inquisitions held for the purpose of deciding 
whether bail ought to be granted with those set forth at the actual trial before 
justices in eyre. Her findings upport her conclusion that: 
... on the whole, discrepancies between two or more verdicts were over details of loca- 
tion and the sequence of events, the sort of thing on which independent witnesses could 
easily differ . . . The impression which these comparisons give is of pretty general agree- 
ment on the issue of self-defence or accident.... 61 
In one case of "serious discrepancy," the eyre jury suppressed the fact that the 
defendant had retaliated against blows of a staff with a small axe, alleging in- 
stead that he had used a staff in self-defence. The inquisition had alleged that the 
defendant had been struck on the head, cornered and had employed his axe be- 
cause he could not otherwise have escaped death.62 The alteration "may have 
been literally vital" to the defendant, as Miss Hurnard argues, but this would be 
true only because of the overly strict rules of self-defence, not because the trial 
jurors were coming to the aid of a person who had not in fact slain in self-defence. 
How much weight ought we accord to the "pretty general agreement" between 
special inquisitions and trial enrollments? The former were indeed less formal 
than the latter; they were not necessarily final and sometimes less attention was 
paid to the stringent rules of pardonable self-defence. But they were directed to 
the issue of excusable circumstances and were held at the "request of the accused 
or his friends, who probably had some reason for confidence in their outcome."63 
They represented a point in the procedure at which community views as to the 
circumstances of the homicide had become known, and they probably were held 
only when it was fairly clear that community sympathy lay with the suspect. 
This may help to explain the fact that Miss Hurnard was able to find only one 
such commission which determined that the defendant had slain feloniously.64 In
fact, the partiality of jurors at special inquisitions ometimes resulted in favor- 
able verdicts which trial jurors later overturned.65 Miss Hurnard's comparison, 
therefore, is of limited usefulness. Having set along side the trial verdicts a body 
of evidence overwhelmingly favorable to the defendants, i.e., special inquisitions, 
she concluded that the trial verdicts were relatively scrupulous; where they dis- 
agreed with the special inquisitions, they took a more critical, and probably a 
more objective, view of the circumstances. But Miss Hurnard was unable to es- 
tablish the relationship between a random selection of indictments and the trial 
verdicts. That relationship can be established, if at all, only by comparing the 
coroners' enrollments with the verdicts given at trial. Miss Hurnard recognized 
the potential value of such a correlation, but rightly concluded that too few 
thirteenth century coroners' rolls exist to carry it out. 
Miss Hurnard had before her, but did not cite, one important piece of evidence 
61 Hurnard, p. 265. 
62 Ibid., p. 261. 
63 Ibid., p. 110. 
64 Ibid., p. 254. 
6 Ibid., p. 110. 
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which raises some doubts about her thesis. A thirteenth century prcedent book, 
Placita Corone, describes the case of a man indicted for homicide. The defendant, 
a certain Thomas, came before the court and told his story as follows: 
And because I refused him (tbe deceased) the loan of my horse he ran at me in my own 
house with a Welsh knife, horn handled, in his right hand and inflicted several wounds 
on my head, shoulders, feet, and elsewhere on my body wherever he could reach. I did 
not at first return his blows; but when I realized that he was set on killing me I started 
to defend myself: that is to say I wounded him in the right arm with a little pointed 
knife which I carried, making no further onslaught and acting in this way to save my 
own life."6 
One justice put the court's impatience with such formulistic defences quite suc- 
cinctly: 
Thomas, you have greatly embroidered your tale and coloured your defence: for you are 
telling us only what you think will be to your advantage, and suppressing whatever you 
think may damage you, and I do not believe you have told the whole truth."7 
Nevertheless, the defendant stood his ground, putting himself upon the country. 
When the petty jury testified under oath that Thomas' story was true, the court 
could only remand him to await his pardon. 
Thomas' case is perhaps an exaggerated example, but it is not very different 
from a great many thirteenth century enrollments. Moreover, it demonstrates 
that the justices were aware of fact coloration in cases of self-defence but that 
juries were not intimidated even when doubts had been expressed from the 
Bench. Miss Hurnard recognized that formulistic descriptions of self-defence raise 
"suspicion that some of these circumstances were borrowed from other cases." 
She admitted that: 
It may be judged that too many slayers in self-defence pulled stakes from fences and 
poles from carts, bolted into culs-de-sac or tried and failed to climb walls, were brought 
up against dykes or rivers, found swords unexpectedly but conveniently to hand or 
made random knife thrusts that just happened to hit vital spots.08 
Nevertheless, Miss Hurnard concluded that victims of assault "naturally reacted 
in a similar manner;" that the "paucity of many of the clerks' Latin vocabulary" 
led them to fall back on the same terminology. Before 1307, she maintained, the 
verdicts do not 
tend to become divorced from the realities09.. . the jurors were not yet falling back on 
one or other set of prefabricated tales which could be borrowed, isguised only with 
minor variants, to substantiate heir declaration that slayings had been in self-defence.70 
Perhaps she is correct, but there appears to be little evidence to support her 
I6 Placita Corone, ed. J. M. Kaye (London, 1966), pp. 19-20. 
67 "Thomas, vous avez mut enbeli vostre parole et vostre defens enflori: kar vous pronunciez quant ke 
vous quidez ke vous poet valer et conceler ce ke grever vos poet, kar je ne quid pars ke vos eiez tote la verite 
conte." 
68 Hurnard, p. 267. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p. 268. 
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view.7' One has the impression Miss Hurnard has resolutely taken her stand in the 
face of nearly irresistible conclusions of common sense. 
Miss Hurnard never attempted to explain the high number of acquittals on the 
medieval rolls. She viewed the area of pardonable homicife largely in isolation 
from other elements of the administration of criminal aw. This is an important 
point, for the possibility that the acquittals resulted from jurors' failure to tell 
the truth threatens to undermine the notion that jurors were particularly scrupu- 
lous in cases of excusable homicide. 
While Miss Hurnard's thesis cannot be conclusively disproved, there are good 
reasons to believe that fourteenth century societal attitudes were not radically 
different from those of the preceding period. To explore these reasons, we must 
turn from the narrow confines of pardonable homicide to the general contours of 
the early history of liability for homicide. 
b. 
In the Anglo-Saxon period, and for perhaps a century after the Norman Con- 
quest, some homicides were unemendable, leading to punishment - usually 
capital - at the hands of the Crown.72 These homicides, secret homicides known 
as 'murders,' were considered particularly heinous and, as outrages against society 
as a whole, were exclusively royal pleas. It cannot be determined how closely the 
Anglo-Saxon 'murder' corresponded to the 'murder' of the late fourteenth cen- 
tury.73 Probably the term always had connoted stealth; the slayer acted when his 
victim was off guard. But it appears that any homicide committed in the absence 
of a witness was presumed to have been committed through stealth. It was in 
secret, and, hence, a murder. Open homicide, on the other hand, remained until 
the outset of the twelfth century an emendable act.74 The guilty party or his kin 
paid wer, bot and wite. Failure to pay the wer couild result in liability to the feud; 
71 In her analysis of the king's role in the pardoning process, Miss Hurnard argues that "in a sample 
of well over 500 cases identified on the plea rolls pardon is very unlikely to have been granted to 
felonious killers in more than twenty percent, and even ten percent may be considerably above the 
mark" (p. 245). This assumes, of course, that the evidence on the plea rolls is trustworthy. What the 
author has proved is that the king did not often grant pardons to persons for whom there was not 
some favorable testimony, not that those who in fact slew feloniously were seldom able to obtain 
pardons. Miss Hurnard also shows that presenting juries often used the phrase mota contencione to 
describe "fatal free fights"; they did not adduce testimony of pardonable circumstances in all such 
free fights. This does not prove the trial jury would not have done so had the suspect appeared and 
put his life in their hands. 
72 Iurnard, p. 1. 
73 See Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, ii, 486; Kaye, "Early History," Part I, 
866 ff. Kaye argues that 'murder' retained its ancient meaning of "secret or stealthy killing" during 
the twelfth through fourteenth centuries, despite the fact that it was also used as a synonym for the 
general term 'kill' and a fine for an unexplained homicide. Kaye failed to show that the concept was 
deeply embedded in societal attitudes during the entire period. Possibly, the social view of 'murder' 
changed, due to the growth of professional crime, from certain specific acts, e.g., poisoning, to all 
planned homicides. 
74 Hurnard, p. 8. Miss iEurnard ventures the judgment that "the process may have been completed 
by the end of the reign of Eenry I." But she cautions: "The date when this occurs is not known." 
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after the tenth century, only the slayer could be subjected to the vengeance of 
the slain man's kin.75 Althougb there is no evidence as to the frequency of such 
feuds, it is likely that settlement in money or in kind was the normal result of 
sudden and open acts of homicide. If the slaying resulted from a mutual quarrel 
and involved fighting on both sides, some elements of self-defence probably lay 
side by side with elements of excessive retaliation. Settlements probably took 
these elements into account, though in an impressionistic way. 
The extension of royal jurisdiction in the twelfth century to encompass the 
entire area of homicide had two revolutionary effects: many homicides which 
formerly had not resulted in capital punishment were now made capital under the 
law; strict and largely unenforceable requirements were introduced into a law of 
self-defence. Miss Hurnard, in an ingenious opening chapter, explained why the 
Crown took jurisdiction over excusable homicide at the time it made open homi- 
cide a royal plea.76 She also discussed at length the residual attempts of the kin to 
obtain compensation;77 and, in this context, she suggested that the kin could, 
without dishonor, accept money in lieu of appealing an open slayer. But she did 
not argue that society balked at the novelty of hanging those who had committed 
open homicide, particularly those who had slain in situations involving some mea- 
sure of provocation. By implication, at least, it is Miss Hurnard's view that society 
at large had no objection to presentment of the open slayer; if the kin had an ob- 
jection, it was chiefly because presentment greatly reduced their chances to ob- 
tain monetary compensation. 
The evidence as to jury attitudes in the fourteenth century may aid in under- 
standing societal attitudes toward criminal iability in the entire period from late 
Anglo Saxon times to the end of the middle ages. If so, the argument would run 
as follows. Originally, the Anglo-Saxons practiced the feud in homicide cases. The 
kin of the slain took vengeance upon the slayer or one of his kin, who were jointly 
liable for their kinsman's act.78 Whether the mental element was taken into ac- 
count is unknown. Secret homicide was a matter for the king, but all other homi- 
cides were emendable; failure to pay the wergeld rendered the slayer and his kin 
liable to vendetta, though reduction of the amount of compensation by agreement 
was probably common. By the tenth century, the laws restricted liability to 
vendetta to the actual slayer. They also mandated that the court reduce com- 
pensation where there had been mitigating circumstances.79 In such cases, where 
the slayer had acted in self-defence or through accident, the king relinquished the 
'1 II Edmund 1, in The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I, ed. A. J. Robertson 
(Cambridge, 1925). 
76 Hurnard, 25 if. In brief, Hurnard argues that the King took jurisdiction over self-defence and 
accident because otherwise the kin of the victim might attempt to pass off more serious homicides 
as excusable ones in order to avoid having to bring an appeal and thereby lose an opportunity to make 
a private settlement. 
77 Hurnard, chs. vii and viii. 
78 D. Whitelock, The Beginnings of English Society (Harmondsworth, 1952), p. 39. 
79 III Edgar, 1, 2: "there is to be such remission in the compensation as is justifiable before God 
and supportable in the State." Quoted by Hurnard, p. 5; VI Ethelred, 52, 1: "he who is an involuntary 
agent in his misdeeds should always be entitled to clemency and to better terms." Ibid. 
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wite.80 While the kin of the slain may have taken a narrow view of such mitigating 
circumstances, society at large, having nothing to gain from feud or compensa- 
tion, and in a day when fights began easily and led often to death - due to 
sepsis or other results of poor medical techniques - took a broader view of the 
matter. In its eyes, secret homicide or especially malicious attacks justified 
punishment by death. Simple homicides were seen as requiring compensation, 
with mitigation if the act was unintentional or to some extent provoked. When 
all homicides were drawn within the sphere of royal jurisdiction and made, unless 
excusable, punishable by death, the community was forced to choose between 
presentment of the slayer and payment of the murdrum, a fine imposed for an 
unexplained homicide.81 Before 1215, persons presented for homicide were forced 
to undergo the ordeal, so that if the community desired to absolve a slayer it had 
to fail to present him in the first place. The records do not permit us to observe 
the resulting tension between the bonds of friendship and the demands of the 
pocketbook. By the third decade of the thirteenth century, however, this tension 
had been relieved: once the slayer had been presented, it was left to the trial jury 
to state whether he was guilty or not.82 This provided them with an opportunity 
to acquit or to adduce circumstances of pardonable homicide. The compromise 
which resulted is illustrated in Placita Corone, where a defendant who successfully 
pled self-defence was asked who put him in prison. He replied: 
Sire, my neighbors: for they were afraid of being involved in the affair and suffering loss 
thereby.83 
Thus, from the outset of the common law period, trial juries reflected a sense of 
justice fundamentally at odds with the letter of the law. They persisted through- 
out the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in using their role as submitters of 
evidence to condemn murderers and to acquit or render pardonable those whom a 
later legal age would term 'manslaughterers.' Trial juries remained free to reject 
the conclusions of juries of presentment and of coroners' inquest juries, to say the 
truth as they knew it. Of course, the process of fact alteration, in many cases, 
began before the trial jury gave its verdict: it was not uncommon for a coroner's 
jury to use elaborate formulas to describe a case of self-defence.84 The trial jurors, 
drawn from the hundred where the homicide was committed, but not necessarily 
from the immediate vicinage, probably reflected already settled attitudes of the 
80 F. Sayre, "Mens Rea," Harvard Law Review, XLV (May, 1932) 982. 
81 Hurnard has traced the use of presentment from the late tenth century to the Assize of Clarendon. 
"The Jury of Presentment and the Assize of Clarendon," English Historical Review, LVI (1941) 374- 
410. On the murdrum fine, see ibid., pp. 385 f.; H. G. Richardson and G. 0. Sayles, The Governance of 
Mediaeval England from the Conquest to Magna Carta (Edinburgh, 1963), pp. 195-6. Pollock and 
Maitland, History of English Law, ii, 487. 
82 Rolls of the Justices in Eyre, Being the Rolls of Pleas and Assizes for Lincolnshire, 1218-1219, 
and Worcestershire, 1221, ed. D. M. Stenton (London, 1934), pp. lxviii-lxxi. As Lady Stenton points 
out, judges had never been partial to the ordeal and had, before 1215, tried to persuade defendants to 
put themselves upon the country. 
83 Placita Corone, p. 19. 
64 E.g., J.I. 2. 58, m.4/2 (1380). 
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countryside toward individulal defendants.85 It remains to suggest, by way of con- 
clusion, what were the significant determinants of these societal attitudes. 
IV 
We have seen that in the Anglo-Saxon period murder meant homicide through 
secrecy or stealth. Originally, murder was 'secret' in the narrow sense that the 
slayer hid his victim's body to conceal the deed,86 but it probably was soon used 
more broadly to refer to any homicide whose perpetrator was unknown. It is with 
this aspect of murder that the murdrum fine was associated, for the hundred was 
amerced in all cases of unexplained homicide. 87 It is likely, however, that murder 
already in Anglo-Saxon times might have referred to the fact that the slayer's 
identity was concealed from his victim, so that the latter was taken offguard.88 
Both Glanvill89 and BractonIO refer to murder as homicide wherein the concealment 
was relative to third parties, but this may be due to the fact that by the time they 
wrote, the sole function of the allegation of murder was to relieve the appellor 
from the requirement hat he claim to have seen the deed with his own eyes. 
For our purposes, of course, the important question is, not which acts the official 
concept of murder encompassed, but which acts were considered so heinous by 
society that they believed the perpetrator deserved to be hanged. The answer to 
this question as of the twelfth century will probably never be known. 
By the fourteenth century, society's concept of serious homicide was far 
broader than that corresponding to the original technical meaning of murder. 
Evidence shedding light on the notion of serious homicide is sparse and difficult to 
interpret. The principal sources of such evidence are trial enrollments in verdicts 
of self-defence. In several cases, all dating from the first half of the fourteenth 
century, the jurors included elaborate allegations as to the nature of the de- 
ceased's attack upon the defendant: 
A. M. was staying at the house of S.... and R., knowing M. was staying there, through 
murder and malice aforethought came to the house of S. and sought M. in order to 
kill him . . . R. immediately broke the door of the room and entered it and feroci- 
ously attacked... .91 
85 From the 1280's at least, the sheriff, in preparing for a gaol delivery, ordered the hundred bailiffs 
of his county to supply a panel of sixteen or twenty knights and freeholders for use as jurors. See 
c. 260/4 no. 19 (1288); c. 260/5 no. 14 (1289). Trial juries at the eyre were not always drawn from 
the hundred of the homicide. Crown Pleas of the Wiltshire Eyre, 1249, ed. C. A. F. Meekings (Devizes, 
1961), p. 52. 
86 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, ii, 485. 
87 Supra, n. 81. 
88 Miss Hurnard assumes too much when she defines murder as "secret and so presumably pre- 
meditated killing," p. 1. 
89 Glanvill, ed. G. D. G. Hall (London, 1965), p. 174. 
90 Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. G. E. Woodbine (New Haven, 1915-42), 
iI, pp. 378-79 (fo. 134b). 
91 C. 260/15 no. 38. (1305): "M. hospitatus ad domum cuiusdam Sarre F.... et R. sciens predictum 
M. ibidem hospitatum esse per murdram et maliciam precogitatam venit ad domum predicte Sarre et 
quesivit predictum M. ad ipsuim interfiiendum ... R. ostium eiusdem camere statimfregit et cameram 
intravit . .. ferociter insultavit . . ,. " 
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B. M. about noon of that day maliciously entered and afterward, maliciously abus- 
ing the said W. and commiting hamsoken against him, of his malice aforethought, 
attacked him there in the house [and] threw him to the ground.... 9 
C. R. left the aforesaid house and stood outside the door of the house, of the aforesaid 
W. beneath the wall of that house lying in wait for A. in order to slay him because of 
an old quarrel between them, A. knowing nothing at all about R.'s lying in wait....93 
D. W. was in his house and W.B. knew this. W.B. entered the close of W. at night and 
hid there during the night through malice aforethought, and maliciously lay in wait 
for the said W. in order to kill him, W. being ignorant of this; and when W. arose at 
dawn and left his house closing the door behind him thinking no evil, W.B. with 
malice aforethought suddenly and feloniously....94 
E. H. and S. fought ogether in a mill ... and S. attacked H. with a hatchet and wanted 
to strike him, but they were separated from one another by certain bystanders and 
S. was expelled from the mill.... S., nevertheless his furious intention continuing, 
maliciously devised deceitful plans against H., hiding himself outside of the mill and 
[when] H., believing that the argument between them had been settled, left a little 
later thinking he was leaving safely and in peace....95 
F. J. [was] lying hidden in ambush with two strangers in the house of H. They saw H. 
coming along the way and immediately, feloniously and in a deliberate assault, they 
attacked H. from all sides...... 
The chief purpose of the testimony in the above cases was to support a verdict 
of self-defence. Housebreaking immediately puts those residing within on the 
defensive. Stealth on the part of the assailant, whose presence was until the last 
moment unknown to the eventual slayer, is strong evidence that the latter lacked 
malice (cases C, D, E). It might be argued that the second part of the testimony, 
the formal allegation of last resort (which I have omitted from all the above ex- 
cerpts), was alone insufficient in proving that the defendant had not provoked 
the fight. But it should have been enough merely to assert, as most juries did, that 
A attacked B, wounded B and drove B to the wall. Whatever additional strength 
the above details lent to a special verdict, whether they represented the truth or 
92 C. 262/1/1 no. 6. (1318): "M.... circa horam nonam eius diei maliciose intravit ac postmodum 
maliciose ipsum W. insultando et hamsoken super ipsum faciendo ex malicia sua precogitata ... ipsum 
W. ibidem in domum ad terram prostravit ...." 
93 C. 260/20 no. 26. (1310): "R. exivit domum predictam et stetit extra ostium domus predicti W. subtus 
murum dicte domus insidiando predictum A. ad ipsum interficiendum ratione antiqui odii inter cos 
perhabiti et ipso A. insidiacionem illam omnino nesciente ...." 
94 C. 47, Bedfordshire, File 4/86 (1314): "W. in domo sua propria extitisset et predictus W.B. hoc 
scivisset. W.B. clausum ipsius W. noctanter intravit et ibidem pernoctavit latitando (sic) per maliciam 
excogitatam et predicto W. maliciose insidiabatur ad ipsum W. interficiendum ipso W. hoc omnino 
ignorante t cum W. in aurora diei surrexisset et domum suam exivisset et hostium post se clausisset nulli 
malum cogitans predictus W.B. malicia precogitata in ipsum W. subito felonice prosiliit et cum quodam 
baculo ipsum insultavit ...." 
95 C. 260/15 no. 9. (1304): "H. et S. contenderunt adinvicem infra molondinum ... et idem S. cum 
quadam hachia que vocatur hache a Pylce ipsum H. insultavit et ipsum M. percussisse voluit set per 
quosdam circumstantes seperati fuerunt abinvicem et predictus S. a molendino illo fuit expulsus ... set 
tamen idem S. animofurioso et perseveranti insidias excogitatas adversus ipsum H. maliciose machinaba- 
tur abscondendo se extra molendinum predictum. Et predictus H. credens contencionem illam inter eos 
pacificari post pauca exivit a molendino illo credens secure et pacifice recessisse ...." 
96 C. 260/54 no. 40. (1343): "J. cum duobus hominibus extraneis latitanter insidiando . . in domo 
cuiusdam H. predictum H. transeuntem per viam viebant et statimfelonice et in8ultu premeditato ipsum 
H.... incircuiter insultaverunt ...." 
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were mere fabrications, the jury was describing what society took to be the most 
repugnant form of attack. 
There can be no doubt that the jurors were alleging that the deceased had 
attempted to commit what was considered to be serious homicide - what we 
may call the 'societal concept of murder.' Cases A, C, D, E and F involved stealth; 
housebreaking occurs in A and B; and in all these cases there was some measure 
of planning: malice aforethought was specified in A, B and D, and seems implicit 
in C and F; in E, though his mind was in a fury, the assailant 'devised deceitful 
plans.' The difficulty lies in discerning whether stealth, housebreaking or malice 
aforethought were critical to the societal concept of murder or were merely in- 
cidental. 
The use of per murdram in case A, which was recorded in 1305, is extremely 
rare.97 Murdrum at this time was used almost exclusively with reference to the 
fine for an unexplained homicide, almost never to describe the slayer's act.98 It 
would appear, then, that the phrase meant 'through stealth,' in the sense that the 
slayer acted in such a way as to conceal his identity from third parties. But stealth 
in C, D, E and F appears to refer to the fact that the intended victims were ex- 
plicitly said to have known nothing of the presence of their ambusher. Murder 
was no longer conceived, if indeed it ever had been, solely as the concealment of 
the slayer's identity from third parties. 
The only case which does not involve stealth is B. Here the jurors alleged that 
the would be slayer committed housebreaking, presumably with intent to kill, an 
act which in Anglo-Saxon times had been regarded by the law as particularly 
heinous.99 It may well be that this had always been an element of the social view 
of murder. 
The phrase malicia precogitata, and its variants, - which I have translated as 
'malice aforethought' - was used commonly in indictments of homicide through- 
out the middle ages to denote the threshold egree of mens rea for felonious homi- 
cide: mere deliberateness.100 As I shall demonstrate lsewhere,10' the phrase could 
also be used, in the fourteenth century, to refer to true premeditation. Everything 
depended upon the context. In case A, the assailant came to the defendant's house 
with malice aforethought, not mere deliberateness; 'ex malicia sua precogitata,' in 
case B, seems contextually to represent more than the formulistic 'malicia pre- 
cogitata;' the ambusher in D, who lay in wait throughout he night 'per malician 
excogitatam,' exhibited more than mere deliberateness.'02 In case C, the assailant 
carried an old grudge; like the assailants in E and F, he lay in wait for the de- 
fendant. Only the assailant in E appears to have acted in hot blood. 
Clearly, the jurors were attentive to the mental state of the assailant. It might 
Q7 Kaye found a "Latinised form of the English 'to murder,' synonymous with 'to kill' " in a 19281 
eyre roll (J.I. 1. 147, m. 1Sa). "Early History," Part i, p. 871. 
98 The murdrum fine was effectively abolished in 1840. 14 Edw. III, stat. 1, c. 4. 
99 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, iI, 457. 
100 Kaye, "Early History," Part I, pp. 371 ff. 
101 Supra, n. 10. 
102 Later on in the indictment, malicia precogitata is used in its formulistic sense. 
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be argued, however, that this resulted from their concern to lay the blame for the 
fight at the door of the deceased; or, that planning was merely incidental to most 
acts of stealth, and that premeditation was a common, but not an essential, aspect 
of murder. The foregoing evidence, from the early decades of the fourteenth cen- 
tury, is unclear on this point, and, as we shall see, there is reason to believe that 
even by the end of the century, premeditation had not yet become a necessary 
element in the societal concept of murder. 
The Statute of 1390 equated murder with ambush and malice aforethought.'03 
Its drafters were undoubtedly concerned mainly with highwaymen and house- 
breakers who robbed and slew their victims.104 The official term, 'murder,' opera- 
tive only in the administration of pardons, now clearly embraced homicide per- 
petrated through stealth with respect to the victim. Moreover, true premedita- 
tion had come to be conceived officially as at least a common incident of murder- 
ous intent. Most murder indictments contain only the operative phrase 'murdra- 
vit' or 'insidiavit' (ambushed); frequently, 'noctanter' (by night) appeared. But 
few indictments are richly detailed and fewer still provide insight into a societal, 
as opposed to an official, concept of murder. 
There is nevertheless ome indication that the short lived statute cast murder 
in terms which were too narrow for the community. If murder was, stricto sensu, 
homicide through stealth, where the victim was taken off guard, it was in its 
broadest societal use a particularly repugnant homicide. A case from the roll of 
John Fovyll, coroner in Leicester, and one of the first to employ the word 'mur- 
der' systematically in his indictments, lays to rest the notion that the societal 
concept of a murderous act was dependent upon secrecy or stealth. John Howet- 
son came upon two boys, Roger and Richard Malynson, working near the road 
and wanted to strike them because of a long-held grudge. Seeing this, a certain 
Robert Malesherbe interceded, saying he would take whatever punishment was 
coming to the boys. Their sister Maud arrived at this point and similarly offered 
to make amends, but Howetson, calling her a whore, tried to strike her with a 
hatchet, pursuing her as she fled to her house. Malesherbe followed, imploring 
Howetson not to strike the woman, at which point Howetson turned upon him, 
swinging his hatchet 'with great force.' Malesherbe, 
thinking no evil, neither having a knife with bim nor seeing any other weapon, to prevent 
a blow upon his head, sprang from him and ran into Maud's house to get some weapon 
for defending himself.... 
Malesherbe grabbed a stake, but Howetson broke this and then, aided it seems 
by his son and another relative, proceeded to finish the job. While two held 
Malesherbe down, the other struck him, and when the victim could no longer 
struggle, all dealt mortal blows so that 'they slew and murdered Robert without 
any cause.'10l 
103 "Murdre, Mort d'ome occis par agait, assaut, ou malice purpense." 13 Richard II, stat. 2, c.l. 
104 Supra, p. 672. 
106 J. I. 92. 61, m. 12/1 (1409): ". . . nullum malum cogitans nec super se habens cultellum nec aliqua 
alia arma videns ictum ilium supra caput suum eminere saltavit ab eo et cucurrit in domum ipsius Matil- 
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In another case, admittedly a rare one, there was stealth but not premedita- 
tion. It was alleged that after a vigorous argument, one of the disputants, B, 
turned his back to [A] in the field and A ran to B and suddenly drew the dagger of B and 
feloniously stabbed him twice in the side.... The jurors ay he slew him feloniously and 
murdered him."'0 
The allegation of murder seems to have turned on the deviousness of the act, 
which was apparently not premeditated but committed in hot blood. The word 
'felonia,' rather than murdrum, was later marginated, perhaps indicating that the 
coroner took a different view of the requisite mens rea. 
There is one final point to be made about the late fourteenth and early fifteenth 
century murder indictments. The slaying of master by servant and of husband by 
wife, two forms of statutory petty treason,107 had for centuries been counted 
among the most reprehensible of homicides. Such slayings figured prominently in 
the indictments for murder, and all too frequently the jurors alleged that the vic- 
tim had been slain while he slept in his bed or taken at night by ambush.108 And, 
what is more revealing, occasionally it was said in such cases that the slayer had 
attempted to hide the deceased to conceal the act.109 Murder, thus, had not en- 
tirely lost its most ancient meaning, and, one suspects, its stigma could be at- 
tached to any homicide which society found particularly repugnant. 
The process by which the community determined that a given slayer was a 
murderer was undoubtedly very complex and not solely a function of the slayer's 
immediate act. Coroners' juries and trial jurors were probably swayed in many 
cases by the reputations of the combatants and by what was known about past 
relations between them. Such considerations may have been critical to the deter- 
mination that the defendant had acted through stealth, that he had caught his 
victim off guard. Conversely, these factors must sometimes have conitributed to 
lidis ad aliqua arma sibi assumenda pro defensione t salvacione vite sue ... absque aliqua causa dictum 
R. M. interfecerunt et murdraverunt...." See also, J. I. 2. 61, m.9 2/2 (1406), where the slayer's dog 
attacked the victim, bringing him to the ground, whereupon the slayer 'murdered' him. 
106 J. I. 2. 63, m.S/2 (1400): ". . . vertebat dorsum suum ad eundem in campum, predictus A. cucurrit 
ad predictum B., subito extraxit daggarium ipsius B. et felonice percussit ... bis in latere.. . jurati 
dicuntfelonice interfecit e murdravit...." 
107 25 Edw. III, stat. 5, c.2 (1352). 
108 E.g., J.I. 3. 180, 23d/6 (Gloucester, 1393); J.I. 3. 180, 81/1 (Hereford, 1390); J.I. 3. 203, lld/3 
(Lincoln, 1429). J.I. 2. 190, m.4/3 (Warwickshire, ca. 1390); J.I. 2. 242, m. 5d/6 (Yorkshire, 1388). 
This last case, recorded by a coroner before the Statute of 1390, was one of many indictments reflect- 
ing the use of 'murder' in a commission to justices of the peace in 1380. Rotuli Parliamentorum, in, 
84b. For discussion of justice of the peace indictments based on the commission of 1380, see Kaye, 
"Early History," Part i, 379 ff. The Statute of 1390, with slight modification, repeated the categories 
represented in the commission. I have based my discussion upon the Statute to avoid confusion, but it 
should be noted that indictments began to employ the term 'murder' a decade before the Statute and 
at a time when that term had no operative effect whatsoever. I shall address myself to the commission, 
as well as to the Statute, in a separate article dealing with the official meaning of 'murder' in the four- 
teenth century. 
109 J.I. 2. 163, m.1/6 (1389) and m.2/11 (1393). 
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the conclusion that the parties had fought ogether on equal terms, out of sudden 
and mutual anger. There is, in fact, evidence that in some cases jurors perceived 
simple homicides as 'accidental' ones because the parties were known to have 
been 'friends.'110 It may be, too, that an informal, extra-judicial system of mone- 
tary compensation long outlived the demise of formal wergeld settlement.111 If so, 
the relations between the slayer and his victim's kin may have determined the 
community's perception of the homicide or, at least, of the slayer's just deserts. 
One of the most important weaknesses in Miss Hurnard's analysis is that it 
assumes too much precision in evidence gathering techniques. The coroners' rolls 
leave the impression one would expect: in many cases, the inquest jurors were im- 
precise, confessed lack of knowledge or made little effort o assess blame for a 
fight ending in homicide. Many homicides had been viewed from a distance or not 
at all. At least to the extent that facts were unknown, or poorly documented or in 
conflict with other testimony, there must have been an input of facts unrelated 
to the fact situation of a homicide, but related instead to its social and psychologi- 
cal setting. It may be true that, in the fourteenth century, trial jurors were more 
lenient in some cases than they had been before the change in the Crown's par- 
doning policy. But it is also possible that, with the increase in social mobility and 
the rise of professional crime, trial jurors were called upon more frequently to pass 
judgment on strangers to the neighborhood and dealt with them more harshly. 
In any case, these would merely be two more examples of foreign elements creep- 
ing into the verdict process. The essential nature of that process had not sud- 
denly changed. Due to the nature of the extant evidence, it suddenly becomes 
visible to us, but common sense suggests that it had for centuries been integral 
to the phenomenon of dispute settlement. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
110 E.g., J.I. 1/1185, m.3; C. 145, File 59/46. 
1"I Miss Hurnard stated that out of court settlement was common during the twelfth century, but 
it is unclear how long this continued. Hurnard, p. 9. 
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